12 NICS App. 69, JACKSON v. JARNAGHAN (May 2014)

IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE

HOOPA, CALIFORNIA

Janet Jackson, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

Darin Jarnaghan, Defendant/Appellant.

NO. A-14-003 (May 29, 2014)

SYLLABUS*

Tribal employee filed suit claiming workplace harassment. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Trial court issued order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. Court of Appeals, noting that the motion to dismiss was not based on sovereign immunity, holds trial court order denying motion to dismiss is not a final judgment or a judgment on a dispositive motion, and is therefore not appealable. Appeal dismissed and matter remanded for further proceedings.

Before:

Lisa E. Brodoff, Chief Judge; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Judge; Eric Nielsen, Judge.

Appearances:

Rebecca McMahon, Office of Tribal Attorney, Hoopa Valley Tribe, for Appellant; J. Bryce Kenny, for Appellee.

OPINION

Nielsen, J.:

This is an interlocutory appeal by Darin Jarnaghan, the defendant in a complaint alleging workplace harassment under 30 HVTC § 5.5 brought by plaintiff Janet Jackson. The appeal is from Mr. Jarnaghan’s third motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The trial court denied the motion on April 2, 2014.

Under 30 HVTC § 5.5, “[e]mployees shall be provided with a reasonably safe work environment that is free from harassment” and the “individual who commits prohibited harassment, threatens, or in any way harasses another employee is personally liable for such actions and their consequences.” The code, however, does not define harassment. On October 28, 2013, the parties submitted briefs in the trial court on the issue of proposed standards defining workplace harassment under § 5.5. At the same time, Mr. Jarnaghan also filed a third motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on either California or federal standards for

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workplace harassment, which he argued should be adopted for purposes of a cause of action brought under § 5.5.

On March 5, 2014, the trial court issued a ruling defining standards for workplace harassment under 30 HVTC § 5.5. The court did not adopt wholesale either the California or federal standards of workplace harassment. Instead, the court adopted standards it found were more suited to the Tribe’s unique cultural and political traditions. It did not rule on Mr. Jarnaghan’s motion to dismiss.

On March 20, 2014, Mr. Jarnaghan requested the court rule on his motion to dismiss. On April 2, 2014, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court ruled the legal basis for the motion, that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under California or federal standards of workplace harassment, was irrelevant in light of the court’s March 5th order establishing different standards for a claim filed under § 5.5. The court also noted that in the absence of disputed issues of material facts, a motion for summary judgment was available.

Mr. Jarnaghan appeals from the April 2nd order denying his motion to dismiss. In his Notice of Appeal, Mr. Jarnaghan contends the trial court wrongly based its decision to deny his motion on the standards adopted in its March 5th order. Mr. Jarnaghan claims the trial court did not have the statutory authority to define standards of workplace harassment in the absence of any definition in the Tribe’s code. He asks this Court to reverse both the trial court’s March 5th and April 2nd orders, and grant his motion to dismiss.

Interlocutory appeals are generally disfavored. See Hoopa Valley Tribe v. LeMieux, 6 NICS App. 43, 43-44 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2001) (“[I]t does not serve the interests of judicial economy to allow piecemeal appeals.”). We have followed the majority of jurisdictions, however, in holding that an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss based on tribal sovereign immunity is immediately appealable. See Risling v. Hoopa Valley Tribe 12 NICS App. 66 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2014) (citing Pendergrass v. Sauk-Suiattle Tribe, 11 NICS App. 52, 54 (Sauk-Suiattle Tribal Ct. App. 2013), Hostler v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 10 NICS App. 14 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. App. 2011), and Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919 (9th Cir, 2013)).

HVTC 2.6.01 provides that “any party may appeal a final judgment of the trial court or trial court judgment on a dispositive motion.” In his Notice of Appeal, Mr. Jarnaghan contends the trial court wrongly based its decision to deny his motion on the standards adopted in its March 5th order. He requests both the March 5th and April 2nd orders be reversed and the case be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. It is evident from Mr. Jarnaghan’s contentions and requested relief that he is not appealing from an order denying a motion to dismiss based on tribal sovereign immunity, nor from a final judgment or judgment on a dispositive motion. Moreover, Mr. Jarnaghan is not foreclosed from bringing a summary judgment motion based on the standards adopted by the trial court, nor is he foreclosed from raising the issue of the court’s statutory authority to interpret workplace harassment under § 5.5, along with any other non-frivolous issues, in an appeal from a final judgment following a trial on the merits. There is

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nothing about the issues raised by Mr. Jarnaghan in his Notice of Appeal that compels us to depart from our general rule disfavoring piecemeal appeals.

The appeal is dismissed because it is not from a final judgment or judgment on a dispositive motion as required under HVTC 2.6.01. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this order.


*

The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.