1 NICS App. 29, SPSITHA v. Johnson (September 1988)

IN THE SHOALWATER BAY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

SHOALWATER BAY INDIAN RESERVATION

TOKELAND, WASHINGTON

Southern Puget Sound Intertribal Housing Authority v. Carl Johnson, Jr.

No. SHO-CIV 6/80-434 (September 24, 1988)

SUMMARY

In a breach of contract action which resulted in a claim that one party was unlawfully detaining the premises, the trial court applied the parol evidence rule and excluded the testimony of witnesses intended to establish the circumstances and intentions of the parties at the time of signing both the agreement at issue, and similar contractual agreements between the parties.

Reversing the trial court's order, the Appellate Court held that the parol evidence rule does not apply to proceedings in tribal court. The Court reasoned that it is fundamental to tribal culture that parties to a conflict have their say without legal doctrines unfairly limiting such right. Further, service was proper in that tribal law does not provide that a summons must be signed by the court clerk in order to be valid.

FULL TEXT

Before:	Elbridge Coochise, Chief Justice; Emma Dulik, Justice; Rosemary J. Irvin, Justice.
Appearances:	Jeffry B. Ranes, Olson and Ranes, Montesano, Washington, for the appellant Carl Johnson, Jr. Darrel B. Addington and Shawn Ann Flood, Kane, Vandeberg, Hartinger and Walker, Tacoma, Washington, for the Appellee Southern Puget Sound Intertribal Housing Authority.

APPELLATE DECISION AND ORDER

NATURE OF ACTION:

The appellant was sued by the appellee for unlawful tenancy under a Mutual Help and Occupancy Agreement executed between the parties and dated June 12, 1985.

TRIAL COURT:

The matter was tried pro se by both parties on June 30, 1988 before Judge

1 NICS App. 29, SPSITHA v. Johnson (September 1988) p. 30

Frank S; LaFountaine. Judge LaFountaine found that the appellant had materially breached his contract with the appellee and was unlawfully detaining the premises. A writ of restitution to the appellee was issued.

COURT OF APPEALS:

On a Motion for a Continuance to hear the Appeal, made by the appellant, on August 23, 1988, the Appellate Court continued the matter, ordering that the matter would be determined on the briefs which the parties would submit and on the record, unless a hearing appeared necessary. On September 24, 1988 the Appellate Court rendered its opinion based on the briefs submitted by the parties and on the record. The Court unanimously reversed the trial court order and remanded the matter for a new trial, with instructions.

I.

The Parol Evidence Rule does not apply to proceedings in Shoalwater Bay Tribal Court

During the course of the trial, Judge LaFountaine refused to hear the testimony of twelve witnesses whom the defendant proffered to establish the circumstances and intentions of the parties at the time of signing the Mutual Help and Occupancy Agreement. The witnesses were offered to establish circumstances and intentions surrounding the execution of similar contractual agreements with the appellee. The Court excluded the testimony of all witnesses except the defendants, basing its decision on the Parol Evidence Rule.

Paramount to other concerns in the conducting of any trial in tribal court is the concern that any party to a proceeding be given a hearing and a fair hearing. Traditionally, anyone who had something to say regarding a matter in controversy would have the opportunity to have their say prior to a decision being rendered by the tribal elders. It is fundamental to tribal culture that parties to a conflict be allowed to have their say without legal doctrines being unfairly imposed to limit this right. Tribal Courts do not exist to enforce the letter of the law as much as they do to serve tribal people with a forum for a fair hearing and a just adjudication, one in which they may run their own case, within reasonable limits, with or without an attorney.

The Parol Evidence Rule is not, and never has been a rule of the Shoalwater Bay Tribe. The Parol Evidence Rule is a rule of substantive law of the State of Washington. The Tribal Court erred in applying the Rule and applying it as a rule of evidence to exclude witnesses.

The Parol Evidence Rule, as traditionally stated in Washington, provides:

[P]arol or extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict written instruments which are contractual in nature and which are valid complete, unambiguous, and not affected by accident, fraud, or mistake ...It is not a rule of evidence but one of substantive law.

1 NICS App. 29, SPSITHA v. Johnson (September 1988) p. 31

Enrich v. Connell 105 Wn.2d 551, 555, 556, 716 P.2d 863 (1986)

However the parol evidence rule only applies to a writing intended by the parties as an 'integration' of their agreement; i.e., a writing intended as a final expression of the terms of the agreement... In making this preliminary determination of whether the parties intended the written document to be an integration of their agreement, which is a question of fact, the trial court must hear all relevant, extrinsic evidence, oral or written.

Enrich v. Connell, supra.

First, there is no requirement that the parol evidence rule be given credence in the Shoalwater Bay Tribal Court. Insomuch as it is used, it is advisory only. Secondly, even if used as advisory and applied to a matter pending in tribal court, it is considered by the Washington state court to be a rule of substantive law and not of evidence. Applied according to the rule in Washington state court, it cannot be used to cut off testimony which is relevant to a preliminary determination as to whether the parties to an agreement intended the written document to be an integration of their agreement.

II.

Service was proper.

There is no requirement that the Summons tor a Complaint be signed by the Clerk of the Court under Shoalwater Bay Tribal law, as alleged by the appellant.

In this case the appellant was present at the time of trial, prepared to proceed with his defense and had twelve witnesses to testify on his behalf. There was no defect in service.

III.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Tribal Court were not supported by the evidence.

The following findings of the Trial Court were unsupported by the record, that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Trial Court/ XV.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Trial Court/ XVII.

1 NICS App. 29, SPSITHA v. Johnson (September 1988) p. 32

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Trial Court/XVII

THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: This matter is remanded to the Trial Court for retrial on all issues with the following instructions:

There is to be no limit on the number of witnesses who testify for or against the appellant until it can be shown that their testimony is repetitive and cumulative.

Further, the trial judge is not to take a party's word, representing himself pro se, as to whether potential witnesses will testify to the same information. The Court is to make an independent determination from the witnesses as to whether the proffered testimony will be repetitive and cumulative.