23 NICS App. 35, HENRY IV v. TTT (December 2025)
IN THE TULALIP TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
TULALIP INDIAN RESERVATION
TULALIP WASHINGTON
Leroy Henry IV, Appellant
v.
The Tulalip Tribes, Appellee.
NO. TUL-CV-AP-2025-0439 (December 22, 2025)
(Reconsideration Denied, March 10, 2026)
SYLLABUS*
Court of Appeals ruled that appellant’s convictions must be reversed because the search and seizure leading to the evidence against him were unlawful. All evidence should have been suppressed, leaving no basis for prosecution. Accordingly, trial court’s denial of suppression was reversed, jury verdict vacated, charges dismissed, and case remanded with instructions to immediately release appellant from custody.
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Before: Appearances: |
Daniel A. Raas, Chief Justice; Daniel A. Brown, Associate Justice; John C. Sledd, Associate Justice. Krystle Curley, Prosecutor, for Appellee; Alexander Milvae, for Appellee. |
OPINION
Per curiam:
Appellant Leroy Henry IV raises multiple arguments supporting his claim for either vacating the verdict against him or ordering a new trial based on evidentiary issues and jury instruction questions. As this matter is fully resolved with the resolution of the initial issue of whether the search and seizure of Appellant was valid under either Tulalip law and/or Washington case authority, the additional issues raised by Appellant in this matter are moot.
For the reasons set forth below, the trial court order denying dismissal of all charges and suppression of evidence is reversed (and by reason thereof, the verdict of the jury is also reversed and vacated). Thus, Appellant is entitled to (1) dismissal of the underlying action and charges as
23 NICS App. 35, HENRY IV v. TTT (December 2025) p. 36
quintessential “fruits of the poisonous tree”; (2) vacation of the jury verdict; and (3) an order procuring his immediate release from any incarceration based on his conviction in this matter.
Factual Background Incident to Appellant’s arrest.
On January 25, 2025, Tulalip Tribal Officers began the process of conducting a routine traffic stop of a car at night without appropriate headlights illuminated (the “traffic stop”). The auto was driven by Ms. Sonnier with Ms. Stewart as a passenger in the front seat and Appellant as a passenger in the rear seating area of the vehicle. Although the traffic stop began on the Tulalip Reservation, it concluded off the Reservation at a nearby gas station parking lot in Marysville, Washington. The Tribal Officer questioned the driver and determined that she lacked a driver’s license. The officer then ordered the front seat passenger to identify herself and at some point determined that she was the protected party of a Tulalip Tribal Court domestic violence protection order.
It was not until over six minutes into the traffic stop that the investigating Tribal Officer even realized Appellant was present in the back seat of the car. It was at this time that the Tribal Officer requested Appellant to identify himself as part of what the officer later testified was a “social contact.” Only after requiring Appellant to identify himself were the officers able to put “2 and 2” together and conclude that he was the restrained individual in the domestic violence no-contact order protecting the front seat passenger in the traffic stop.
Thereafter, and only as a result of Appellant’s seeming violation of the no-contact order, Appellant was found to have methamphetamine on his person.1 Appellant argues that the Tribal Officer had no particularized suspicion that Appellant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an infraction or other crime. We agree.
Did Tribal Officers Have the Right to Inquire of Appellant’s Name and/or Identity Incident to the Traffic Stop?
As stated above, the short answer is “No.” Both Tulalip and Washington State law support the inevitable conclusion that Appellant could not be questioned and inquired of his identification by the investigating Tribal Officer as there was no independent basis2 to support the request.3 See State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689, 699 (2004). Likewise, Tulalip law requires the same as it permits an officer to “stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” TTC 2.25.030(4)(b). Without such particularized suspicion, investigating Tribal Officers may not “obtain or verify an account of the
23 NICS App. 35, HENRY IV v. TTT (December 2025) p. 37
person’s presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person.” Id. Only then, under Tulalip law, may an investigating Tribal Officer “demand the name and present address of the person.” TTC 2.25.030(4)(c)(iii). The Tribal Court erred in applying federal search and seizure law rather than the law of the Tribes, which is paralleled by state law.
The parties spend significant time in briefing arguing what law may have applied to the search and seizure of Appellant based on a traffic stop that began on the Tulalip Reservations but ended off reservation in Marysville, WA. The Tribes argue that the matter is one of sovereignty and self-determination, so tribal law must apply. The Appellant argues that the issue is covered by cross-deputization of Tribal Officers under Washington law. Because tribal and state law concur on the need for particularized suspicion to stop, investigate, and search an individual, the issue is ultimately irrelevant to this Court’s decision.4
On the record before us the Tribal Court could not properly conclude that the investigating Tribal Officer had a particularized suspicion that Appellant was doing anything rising to level of a crime or offense, since Appellant was unknown to be in the car at all until after six minutes into the traffic stop when he was finally “found.” At that time, the investigating Tribal Officer had no reason to suspect Appellant of anything. Even if the officers were aware of the no-contact order entered for the benefit of Ms. Stewart (which the record does not support), simply because Appellant is a man would not satisfy the obligation of proving particularized suspicion of a violation of a no-contact order in this matter.5
Nor can the search be sustained based on the Tribal Court’s finding“[a]t the time the officer asked the Defendant for identification the officer observed that the Defendant was not wearing a seat belt.” That finding is clearly erroneous. Although a supplemental police report mentions that Appellant was not wearing his seatbelt when questioned, the original report and the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing make no mention of such an infraction while the vehicle was in operation, or that it was the reason for asking Appellant’s name. Rather, the officer testified that it was difficult to observe Appellant at all because of dark tinted rear windows and clutter in the back seat. Body camera video also showed that the vehicle was parked with the ignition off, and out of operation, for several minutes before Appellant was seen at all. This Court finds it dispositive that the testifying officer characterized his inquiry into to Appellant’s name as a “social contact.” It was not rooted in a seat belt infraction or any particularized suspicion regarding Appellant.
Based on this Court’s conclusion that the search and seizure were impermissible, all evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible as it falls as “fruits of the poisonous tree”6 leaving the Tribes with no evidence to prosecute Appellant for the charges brought. Accordingly, neither the amount of methamphetamine that Appellant had on his person, nor instructions related
23 NICS App. 35, HENRY IV v. TTT (December 2025) p. 38
thereto, nor the foundation or lack thereof of the admitted jail house calls supposedly made by Appellant have any further relevance in this matter, therefore, a determination of such issues is unnecessary and moot.
Accordingly, the Tribal Court is REVERSED for its failure to suppress all evidence gained through the traffic stop, the jury verdict is VACATED and the underlying charges are DISMISSED. Furthermore, this matter is REMANDED to the Tribal Court with instructions to promptly issue an appropriate order to secure Mr. Henry’s immediate release from incarceration.7
The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
Because we dismiss all charges, the amount of the methamphetamine at issue and calculating that amount of such contraband drugs is not pertinent to the resolution of this matter. By issuing this Opinion, the Court in no way sanctions Appellant’s actions in possessing such methamphetamine (regardless of the weight) and recognizes the dangerous and significant issues facing this Tribe and so many others over drug related crimes. The Court also disapproves of the Appellant’s apparent violation of the Domestic Violence Protection Order, recognizing that domestic violence is another present threat to tribal communities.
Under Washington law, an “independent basis” is an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Brown, 154 Wn.2d 787 (2005).
Aside from testifying that the request for identification from the Appellant was a mere “social contact,” the investigating Tribal Officer admitted that he was “not sure if [he] knew there was an order [restraining] at all yet” when he so inquired of the Appellant.
This Court notes, however, that the Tulalip Code specifically provides that “an arrest made outside the boundaries of the Tulalip Reservation shall be valid if made pursuant to the laws of the jurisdiction where the arrest occurred” (see TTC 2.25.040(1).
To this end, this case resembles State v. Allen, 138 Wn. App. 463 (2007) more than any other case. In that case, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the arresting officer acted illegally when he asked for the passenger’s name even when the driver was known to have a no-contact order issued for her protection against a male. Id. at 471. As such that officer knew of no reasonable articulable facts within the scope of the original traffic stop that would justify questioning the passenger. Id. 467 and 471.
See State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wn.2d 425, 428 (1967) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
This Opinion assumes Appellant is not currently being held in confinement on another proceeding or charge. If so, this Court’s ruling does not impact such other proceeding or confinement based on other matters or orders of court.