3 NICS App. 372, Hatch v. Cultee (January 1995)
IN THE TULALIP TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
TULALIP INDIAN RESERVATION
MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON
Hatch v. Cultee
No. TUL-Ci-6/94-311 (January 10, 1995)
SUMMARY
Appeal of Trial Court Order dismissing Appellant's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court on the grounds that the subject of dispute was not governed by a specific Tribal Ordinance and, therefore, did not create subject matter jurisdiction as defined in Ordinance 49.
FULL TEXT
Before: Chief Justice Elbridge Coochise, Associate Justice Dennis Nelson, and Associate Justice Christopher Williams.
Appearances: Victor Haglund, attorney for Appellant, Roy E. Hatch; Ian Millikan, attorney for Respondents, Harry C. and Leah Cultee.
NATURE OF THE ACTION
Appellant signed as guarantor on bank loan to Respondent. After Respondent's default on the loan, and upon Bank's demand, Appellant paid Bank. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint against Respondent in Tulalip Tribal Court, seeking repayment of monies which Appellant had paid to Bank. Trial Court dismissed complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant appeals Trial Court order.
PER CURIAM:
THIS MATTER came before the Tulalip Court of Appeals on December 5, 1994, on Plaintiff/Appellant's written appeal filed on September 20, 1994. Appellant appeals the September 9, 1994, Order of the Tulalip Tribal Court dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Present at the hearing were Ian Millikan, attorney for Defendants/Respondents, Harry C. Cultee and Leah Cultee; and Victor Haglund, attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, Roy E. Hatch.
3 NICS App. 372, Hatch v. Cultee (January 1995) p. 373
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This matter originated in the Tulalip Tribal Court as a suit for monies owed. On December 13, 1991, Defendant/Respondent Harry Cultee entered into a financial transaction with First Heritage Bank of Snohomish, evidenced by a Promissory Note, a Commercial Security Agreement, and a Business Loan Agreement. Also on that date, Plaintiff/Appellant Roy Hatch signed a Commercial Guarantee, wherein he promised to act as guarantor on the loan.
Respondent subsequently defaulted on the loan. On May 6, 1994, First Heritage Bank of Snohomish requested that Appellant, as co-signer, pay the balance of the loan.
On June 8, 1994, Appellant filed a complaint in Tulalip Tribal Court against Respondents for repayment of the money which Appellant paid to First Heritage Bank. On July 29, 1994, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to remove a party defendant. The scheduled hearing was continued to and held on September 9, 1994, at which time the Tulalip Tribal Court dismissed Appellant's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.12 It is this order which Appellant now appeals.
JURISDICTION
The Tulalip Tribal Court has personal jurisdiction in this matter because both parties are members of the Tulalip Tribe. Territorial jurisdiction exists because both parties reside on the Tulalip Reservation and the dispute is within the Tulalip Reservation boundaries. The Tulalip Tribal Appellate Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tulalip Tribal Ordinance No. 49, Section 1.11.1. The existence of the Tribal Court's subject matter jurisdiction is the issue on appeal.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Tulalip Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the dispute before it.
Plaintiff/Appellant contends that the Tribal Court does have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter. Appellant argues, first, that the matter concerns a dispute between tribal members; second, that the dispute was negotiated on the Tulalip Reservation; and third, that the purpose of the loan was to purchase a fishing boat to be used on Tribal property and under the auspices of Tribal Fishing Ordinances. Appellant further contends that the Tribal Court misinterpreted Title I, Section 1.2.1 of Ordinance No. 49 when it failed to construe that section as conferring general civil jurisdiction upon the Tribal Court.
3 NICS App. 372, Hatch v. Cultee (January 1995) p. 374
Defendant/Respondent contends that Title I, Section 1.2.3.1 of Ordinance No. 49 specifically limits the Tribal Court's jurisdiction to "disputes and matters arising under the provisions of tribal ordinances." Respondent argues that the subject of this dispute is purely contractual in nature, based solely upon Appellant's demand for repayment for monies remitted to First Heritage Bank, and that Appellant has not alleged any violation or pursued any enforcement of any Tribal Ordinance. Thus, Respondent contends, this dispute does not arise "under the provisions of tribal ordinances", and does not create subject matter jurisdiction in the Tribal Court.
STATEMENT OF LAW
Rule 4.11 of the Civil Rules for the Tulalip Tribal Court provides that the court must dismiss any claims before it whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Title I, Section 1.2 of Ordinance 49 of the Tulalip Tribes specifically addresses the issue of civil jurisdiction. Section 1.2.1 states, in relevant part:
Except as limited by Section 1.2.3 below, the Tribal Court shall have original civil jurisdiction [and] . . . . Except as limited by Section 1.2.3 below, such original civil jurisdiction . . . shall extend to and include adjudication of civil disputes and matter arising under tribal ordinances and enforcement of the provisions of tribal ordinances.
Section 1.2.3 establishes the limitations on the Tribal Court's civil jurisdiction. Section 1.2.3.1 states:
The civil jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribal Court by the provisions of Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 above is hereby expressly limited to adjudications of disputes and matters arising under the provisions of the tribal ordinances, and enforcement of the provisions of the tribal ordinances.
This Court construes Section 1.2.3.1 to limit the general civil jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribal Court in Section 1.2.1 to hear and adjudicate only those disputes and matters which arise under a specific Tribal Ordinance; in other words, the Tribal Court has jurisdiction to decide a dispute if the subject matter of the dispute falls under the auspices of a Tribal Ordinance governing that particular subject.
Appellant contends that Section 1.2.1 must be read to confer jurisdiction upon the Tribal Court in three areas: (1) adjudication of civil disputes; (2) disputes arising under Tribal Ordinances, and; (3) enforcement of Tribal Ordinances. We disagree; such a reading of Section 1.2.1 would render Section 1.2.3.1 meaningless.
3 NICS App. 372, Hatch v. Cultee (January 1995) p. 375
DISCUSSION
This Court previously ruled on October 17, 1989, that Section 1.2.3.1 of the Tulalip Law and Order Code "limits the civil jurisdiction of the Tulalip Tribal Court to matters which arise under the tribal ordinance." Smith v. Port Susan Camping Club, et al., 16 I.L.R. 6169, (Tula. Tr. Ct. App., 1989).13 In that case, plaintiffs alleged that certain conduct of the Board of Directors of the Port Susan Camping Club violated the Club's charter and by-laws. The Club filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Plaintiffs contended that the action was authorized by the Club's corporate charter.
In Port Susan, this Court distinguished between an "ordinance" and a "charter". The court defined an ordinance as "a legislative enactment of the Tribe", while "[t]he charter granted to [the Club] by the Tribe merely authorizes the club to do business within the boundaries of the Tulalip Reservation." Id. at 6170.
At the time that plaintiffs filed their case against the Club, no Tribal Ordinance existed that authorized the Tribal Court to hear disputes between Port Susan Camping Club and its members. Several weeks after the case was filed, however, the Tulalip Tribe passed Ordinance 72, which allowed the Tribal Court to hear such disputes. We explicitly noted in Port Susan that prior to the passage of Ordinance 72 "no subject matter jurisdiction existed for the Tribal Court to hear disputes between the club and its members . . . . [and] that the Tribal Court's jurisdiction over civil disputes was dependent upon grants of authority by Tribal ordinance." Id. Emphasis added. We found, therefore, that the Tribal Court was correct in dismissing the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.14
In the case at bar, as in Port Susan, there is no tribal ordinance specifically governing the subject matter of this dispute. The heart of the dispute between Appellant and Respondent is contractual in nature, and the Tulalip Tribe's Board of Directors (the Tribe's legislative body) has not enacted any legislation that addresses such issues. As such, the suit is not a dispute or matter "arising under the provisions of tribal ordinances."
3 NICS App. 372, Hatch v. Cultee (January 1995) p. 376
We hold, therefore, that the Tribal Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as required by Civil Rule 4.11 and as defined and limited by Ordinance No. 49, Title I, Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.3.1. Appellant's contentions that the dispute is between Tribal members, that the contract was negotiated on Tribal property, and that the boat was to be used under a Tribal Fishing Ordinance, even if presented as evidence and proven as true, would still fail to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the Tribal Court.
The Court would remind the parties, however, of the ruling in Port Susan "that the Tribal Court's jurisdiction over civil disputes was dependent upon grants of authority by Tribal ordinance." This language, while limiting, is also instructive. Parties involved in disputes whose subject matter is not governed by Tribal Ordinance need not be left without remedy. Rather, members seeking such remedies have the option to approach the Tribe’s legislative body with requests for appropriate legislative relief.
Further, in the case at bar, the parties have provided within the body of the contract with First Heritage Bank that any matters under dispute would be resolved in Snohomish County Court. Therefore, a forum for remedy is available to the parties.
ORDER
The Order of September 9, 1994, of the Tulalip Tribal Court dismissing Appellant's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Tribal Court declined to rule on Appellant's motion to dismiss a party defendant based on mootness of the issue.
This case also published as Smith v. Port Susan Camping Club, on page 60 of the Appellate Court Opinions: Northwest Regional Appellate Courts, "Decisions, Judgments and Orders for 1989", (compiled by the Northwest Intertribal Court System).
In Port Susan this Court went on to consider the retroactive effect of Ordinance 72. We noted that the determination of retroactive effect would "hinge upon whether Ordinance 72 relates solely to remedies or procedure, or whether any substantive rights and liabilities were altered when that ordinance was enacted." Id. Since the ordinance merely provides a forum for asserting and litigating disputes over substantive rights already in existence, we found that Ordinance 72 was remedial and not substantive in nature and applied it retroactively.