4 NICS App. 159, CAMPION v. SWANASET (December 1996)
IN THE NOOKSACK TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
NOOKSACK INDIAN RESERVATION
DEMING, WASHINGTON
Sandra Campion, Edward Dougherty, Rick MacWilliams, Jeff Williams, Karen Williams, Bryson Cooper, Harry Cooper, Herman Almajero, Saturnio Jarvier, Elizabeth Dilly, Beatrice Cline, Benita Olsen, Mitch Cline, Karie Cline, Phillip Narte, Pearl Pink, Mable Roberts, Elvin Cline, Randy Julian, Tami Cline, Susan Dirogatie, Julia Jefferson, Angie McKay, Diantha Doucette, Robert McKay, Christie Edwards, Gloria Sorrell, Richard Rico, and Frances White, Appellants
v.
George Swanaset, Peter Joseph, John Davis, Laverne Cooper, Ross Cline, Sherie Finkbonner Johnny, Bob Rabang, Roszelda Roberts, Lane Warbus, The Nooksack Tribal Council, and the 1996 Nooksack Election Board, Respondents
No. NOO-C-496-004 (December 17, 1996)
SUMMARY
Appeal of trial court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants (plaintiffs below) challenged constitutionality of certain actions of the Election Board. Trial court held that tribal court has no jurisdiction to review actions of the Election Committee and dismissed. We remand to trial court for trial.
FULL TEXT
Before: Elbridge Coochise, Chief Justice; Charles R. Hostnik, Justice; and Douglas W. Hutchinson, Justice.
Appearances: James Purcell, attorney for Appellants; Richard Baum, attorney for Respondents.
This matter came before the Nooksack Tribal Court of Appeals for oral argument on November 12, 1996. Appellants are individual Tribal members appealing the trial court’s July 3, 1996 Order Denying Reconsideration.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 1, 1995 the Nooksack Tribal Council enacted the Nooksack Tribal Election
4 NICS App. 159, CAMPION v. SWANASET (December 1996) p. 160
Ordinance of 1996 (Title 62A) which: (1) amended the previous election ordinance, (2) set the 1996 Tribal Council election for March 9, 1996, and (3) provided for the appointment of an Election Board whose duties were to “administer and conduct the election.” The Election Ordinance required the Election Board to notify voters of the election by mailing a notice to all qualified voters and to post the notice in four specified locations.
The parties do not dispute that the election notice was not posted at any of the four required sites; however, notice was posted at the Tribal Center. Neither do the parties dispute that the 1996 eligible-voter mailing list was compiled from the tribal newsletter mailing list and contained approximately 263 individual tribal members. There are 955 tribal members who meet the Nooksack Constitution’s requirement that one be a tribal member and over the age of eighteen to be eligible to vote. See Nooksack Tribal Constitution, art. IV, § 1.
The 1996 Election Ordinance differs from previous election ordinances in two respects: (1) absentee balloting was eliminated, and (2) as a condition of voting in the 1996 election, all Nooksack voters were required to register to vote by a given date. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of both provisions.
Three weeks after the March 9, 1996 election eight individual tribal members filed a complaint against eight other tribal members and the Nooksack Tribal Council. Plaintiffs alleged that they and other eligible voters had been deprived of their right to vote by Defendants’ enactment and enforcement of the aforementioned 1996 Election Ordinance provisions. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Defendants composing the Election Board violated the Ordinance when they failed to comply with notice requirements.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on June 7, 1996. On that date, the trial court dismissed the action on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to art. IV, § 4 of the Nooksack Tribal Constitution, which provides that it is the duty of the election board to resolve all election disputes. On June 13, 1996 Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 1996 on the ground that Plaintiffs had offered no new evidence in support of their motion. The trial court declined to revisit the issue of jurisdiction. This appeal followed.
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal before this Court are as follows:
1) Does the Nooksack Tribal Court have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action?
2) Is the elimination of absentee balloting from the 1996 tribal election constitutional?
3) Is the 1996 Election Ordinance provision which requires all Nooksack voters to register to vote as a condition of voting in the 1996 election constitutional?
4 NICS App. 159, CAMPION v. SWANASET (December 1996) p. 161
4) Did the individuals composing the Election Board fail to comply with the notice requirements of the 1996 Election Ordinance, thereby individually and/or collectively violating the Ordinance and depriving eligible voters of their right to vote?
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The first issue with which we are confronted is whether the Nooksack Tribal Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action. The trial court in its June 7, 1996 Order determined that such jurisdiction was lacking.
The Nooksack Tribal Court is established by art. VI, § 2 of the Nooksack Constitution. The Nooksack Tribal Court is a constitutional court with jurisdiction over such subject matters as defined in art. VI, § 2(A)(3) of the Nooksack Constitution. That section provides as follows:
This court shall have jurisdiction over all Indians on tribal lands; over all civil matters concerning members of the Nooksack Indian Tribe; over all matters concerning the establishment and functions of the tribal government, provided that nothing herein shall be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the tribal government; and over all cases or controversies between Indians and non-Indians where such cases are brought before it by stipulation of the non-Indian, provided that the court shall have jurisdiction over civil matters arising on tribal lands without the necessity of stipulations of any parties . . . .
Insofar as relevant to this case, there are two possible bases of jurisdiction for this action under that constitutional provision. First, this Court has jurisdiction over “all civil matters concerning members of the Nooksack Indian Tribe.” Second, this Court has jurisdiction over matters concerning the establishment and functions of the tribal government. The latter basis of jurisdiction, however, requires this Court to find a waiver of sovereign immunity before jurisdiction would exist.
Respondents would have us construe the constitutional provision granting the court jurisdiction over “civil matters concerning [tribal] members” to mean that such jurisdiction would only exist in cases between tribal members. We decline to adopt this contorted construction of the plain language of the Nooksack Constitution. The Nooksack people have granted jurisdiction to the tribal court in civil matters concerning tribal members. The role of this Court is to abide by the clear and unambiguous language of the constitutional and statutory provisions before us. We will not violate this fundamental principle of statutory construction.
This action is brought by various named tribal members against other named tribal members and tribal entities. This is a civil action. The action presents issues unique to the members of the Nooksack Indian Tribe regarding the manner in which the 1996 tribal election was conducted. The first basis for jurisdiction clearly exists.
In light of this Court’s finding that a basis for subject matter jurisdiction exists in this case,
4 NICS App. 159, CAMPION v. SWANASET (December 1996) p. 162
we need not address the issue of whether subject matter jurisdiction also exists under the alternate basis set forth above.
Previous Jurisdictional Rulings
On September 23, 1994 in Adams v. Nooksack Election Board, Case No. NOO-C-8/94-014 (hereinafter Adams I), the trial court dismissed a complaint against the election board for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the Nooksack Tribal Council had expressly limited the jurisdiction of the tribal court to specific subject matters which statutorily conferred jurisdiction upon the tribal court. The Adams I court further held that in challenges brought against an Election Board, the Tribe’s Election Code does not confer jurisdiction upon the court to review actions of the Election Committee and that, by statute, the decision of the Election Committee is final.
In February of 1996 the plaintiffs in another election dispute case, Adams v. Nooksack Indian Tribal Council, No. NOO-C-2/96-002 (hereinafter Adams II), moved the trial court to enjoin the March 1996 election, alleging that the 1996 election ordinance violated the Tribal Constitution. The trial court found that the Nooksack Tribal Election Ordinance provided for the election board to resolve election disputes. Nonetheless, before dismissing the action, the trial court found that it “has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the Nooksack Indian Constitution, art. VI, § (2)(A)(3) and art. IX of the Bill of Rights.” [Emphasis added].
Neither Adams I nor Adams II specifically addressed that portion of the Nooksack Constitution upon which we find subject matter jurisdiction as addressed above. A conflict exists between these two trial court decisions, neither of which is binding on this Court. In the case before us, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In now finding subject matter jurisdiction, this Court strictly limits its conclusion to the facts of this case. We leave it to further cases to develop the parameters of this source of subject matter jurisdiction for cases that go beyond the strict confines of this case.
IV. REMEDY
This case raises many important issues which directly touch upon the essence of government -- the ability of tribal members to elect their governmental leaders. The broad issue facing this Court is whether the 1996 election was conducted in a fashion consistent with the constitutional right of tribal members aged 18 and over to vote. A number of subsidiary issues are also present which the current state of the record does not permit us to address.
In light of the unique and extremely important issues presented by this case, it is important to develop a full factual record, with findings of fact, before the legal issues can be decided. The parties and the Tribe deserve no less than a fully informed opinion from this Court. Remanding this action for a full factual inquiry is the only way to obtain such an opinion.
4 NICS App. 159, CAMPION v. SWANASET (December 1996) p. 163
V. ORDER
It is hereby ordered that this action is remanded to the trial court for trial. The trial court is requested to schedule a trial as expeditiously as possible, and to enter formal findings of fact and conclusions of law in rendering its judgment.
Hostnik and Hutchinson, JJ., concur.