5 NICS App. 156, EDENSHAW v. MIC (November 1999)

IN THE METLAKATLA TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

METLAKATLA INDIAN COMMUNITY

METLAKATLA, ALASKA

Ramona Edenshaw, Appellant,

v.

Metlakatla Indian Community, Respondent.

No. 97-2A (November 3, 1999)

SUMMARY

Appellant appeals the Magistrate Court’s judgment finding her guilty of: (1) possession of liquor with intent to sell and (2) perjury. Trial court record does not show that the officer had a valid warrant to seize Appellant’s property, nor does the record show that exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless seizure. Therefore, Court of Appeals held that the initial seizure of Appellant’s property was improper and all charges and sentences were dismissed. Reversed and remanded.

FULL TEXT

Before:            Lorintha Warwick, Chief Justice; Douglas W. Luna, Justice; Rose E. Purser, Justice.

Appearances:  Ramona Edenshaw, Appellant, pro se; Casey Nelson, Sr., spokesperson for Appellant; Leroy Wilder, counsel for Respondent Metlakatla Indian Community.

Luna, J.:

This matter came before the Metlakatla Court of Appeals pursuant to Appellant’s Notice of Appeal filed on March 10, 1997. Appellant appelas the March 3, 1997, judgment of the Magistrate’s Court finding her guilty of possession of liquor with intent to sell, pursuant to §53 of the Code of Criminal Offenses, and perjury, pursuant to §63 of that code.

I. JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over Appellant because she is an enrolled member of the federally recognized Metlakatla Indian Community (MIC). The acts which are the subject of this appeal occurred within the exterior boundaries of the Metlakatla Indian Community Reservation, giving rise to territorial as well as personal jurisdiction. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Metlakatla Ordinance 702, §2(a), Metlakatla Civil Code §2.1.1, and Article V of the Metlakatla Constitution.

5 NICS App. 156, EDENSHAW v. MIC (November 1999) p. 157

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 18, 1997, at approximately 3:56 p.m., MIC Officer Littlefield was checking Taquan Air for boxes that might contain alcohol. He seized two boxes with the name Mona Edenshaw and a phone number on them. He left a note with Taquan Air that he was seizing the boxes. He took the boxes to the police station, called the number, and left a message for the Appellant to contact the police station.

At approximately 4:30 p.m., the Appellant came to the police station to take the boxes. Officer Littlefield asked her to open the boxes. The Appellant refused, stating it was her groceries and that the police had no right to take her boxes. The Appellant stated she was taking the boxes. Officer Littlefield advised the Appellant he was seizing the boxes because he could see bottles inside and had “reasonable doubt” (sic) there was alcohol inside the boxes. (Littlefield report 1-20-97). The Appellant declined a second time to open the boxes, stating she was going to talk to the Chief and she was going to have his job. Officer Littlefield contacted Judge McIntyre and requested a search warrant to open the boxes. A search warrant was granted. The boxes were opened which contained 24 bottles of liquor. At approximately 5:00 p.m., the Appellant was arrested at her home for Liquor Possession for Sale and Threat to a Police Officer.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 21, 1997, the Appellant was arraigned and the matter continued to February 6 and 27, 1997, for violating §53 (Liquor Possession for Sale) and § 19 (Threat or Intimidation). On February 27, 1997, the Magistrate’s Court took the alcohol possession and the perjury charges under advisement. At this same proceeding, the court accepted the Appellant’s no contest plea to the charge of threat and intimidation, § 53 of the Code of Criminal Offenses; suspended the $250 fine; and ordered the jail time she already served be imposed as the penalty. The March 3, 1997, Judgment Order of the Magistrate’s Court found the Appellant guilty of possession of liquor with intent to sell and perjury, pursuant to §§ 53 and 63 of the Code of Criminal Offenses.

On October 14, 1999, at the close of oral arguments before this Court of Appeals, the Respondent moved to dismiss the intimidation and perjury charges and conviction. This Court granted that motion.

IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In her Notice of Appeal, the Appellant raises a number of claims regarding the application of the United States Constitution to these tribal court proceedings. The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C.A. §1301 et seq. applies some, but not all, of the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights to all persons, including tribal members. In her Notice of Appeal, the Appellant argues:

5 NICS App. 156, EDENSHAW v. MIC (November 1999) p. 158

1. The search without a search warrant was invalid; and

2. She did not have possession with the intent to sell the alcohol.

V. APPLICABLE TRIBAL LAW

Ordinance 653, §I(8) of the Metlakatla Code provides:

Any magistrate of the Magistrate’s Court may issue:

(a) an Arrest Warrant, which shall be signed by the Magistrate and be issued only after the filing of a complaint in accordance with the provisions hereof;

(b) a Search Warrant for the search and seizure of property in the ownership, custody, or possession of any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court, which shall be signed by the magistrate and issued only upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, that an offense subject to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court has been committed and which shall name or describe the person or place to be searched and describe particularly any articles of property to be seized. . . . [emphasis adeed].

VI. APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAW

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees each individual the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, thereby limiting the power of a government to intrude upon the rights of an individual citizen. The Indian Civil Rights Act, in incorporating this provision, imposes the same restrictions on tribal governments. 25 U.S.C.A. §1302(2). Therefore, the first issue we must address is the validity of the seizure of the two boxes from Taquan Airlines.

The trial court record does not indicate that Officer Littlefield had a warrant to seize the property from Taquan Airlines. Absent a properly issued warrant to initially seize the property from Taquan Airlines, and absent exigent circumstance, all evidence obtained or discovered as a “factual result” of a violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment right is “fruit of the poisonous tree” and is inadmissible. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

The trial court record is devoid of any evidence that Officer Littlefield ever stated the existence of exigent circumstances requiring the warrantless seizure of property that was in transit between a sender, the shipper, and the receiver. Without a clear written record, we have no choice but to reverse and remand this case for dismissal of all charges. See Ordinance 653, §I(8) of the Metlakatla Code; Mapp, 367 U.S. 643; Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1989); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).

We note that even if the good faith effort on the part of Officer Littlefield could be construed

5 NICS App. 156, EDENSHAW v. MIC (November 1999) p. 159

as exigent circumstances, the same results would occur because of the lack of sufficiency within the trial court record regarding the affidavit and search warrant. In this case, Officer Littlefield “contacted Judge McIntyre and requested a search warrant to open the boxes . . . .” (Littlefield report 1-20-97).

To obtain a search warrant, an officer must provide sufficient information to a magistrate to make an independent determination that probable cause exists that the search will result in discovery and seizure in the warrant application. This application is met by the officer presenting an affidavit to a magistrate in a formal hearing. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

In this case, the court file does not contain a copy of the officer’s affidavit, which is sufficient in and of itself to reverse and remand this case for dismissal of all charges. Frank v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 14 (1978). For a search warrant to be valid, a neutral and detached magistrate who is capable of determining whether probable cause exists must have issued it. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), Loji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). The search warrant must be specific as to the place searched, and the items to be seized must be described with adequate precision so that the officer can recognize them. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).

The court file does not contain a copy of the transcript of the magistrate’s hearing, the search warrant, or the arrest warrant, which is sufficient grounds under Ordinance 653, § I(8) to reverse and remand this case for dismissal of all charges.

VII. ORDER

The March 3, 1997, Judgment Order is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss all charges and sentences.