6 NICS App. 151, HOOPA VALLEY v. MILLIE GRANT (August 2004)
IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL SUPREME COURT
HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION
HOOPA, CALIFORNIA
Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, Appellants,
v.
Millie Grant, Appellee.
No. A-03-004 (August 24, 2004)
(Reconsideration denied, October 25, 2004)
SYLLABUS*
Trial court, sitting in its appellate capacity, ruled that a TERO Commission decision denying a retroactive pay increase to an employee assigned additional duties was arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. Court of Appeals holds that (1) trial court was correct in finding that the employee had requested a pay increase contemporaneously with the assignment of the additional duties; (2) employee’s claim therefore was not for a retroactive pay increase, but rather for back wages owed; and (3) TERO Commission erred by relying on laws applicable to requests for retroactive pay increases. Order of trial court affirmed.
Before: Elizabeth Fry, Chief Justice; Lisa Atkinson, Justice; Martin Bohl, Justice.
Appearances: Grett L. Hurley for Appellants. J. Bryce Kenny for Appellee.
OPINION
Bohl, J.:
This matter came before the Supreme Court of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court pursuant to Appellant’s Notice of Appeal filed on April 28, 1999. The Hoopa Valley Tribal Council appeals the Judgment entered by the Hoops Valley Tribal Court on April 23, 1999.
Oral Argument was heard on October 20, 2003 by telephone conference call. Attorney Grett L. Hurley appeared for the Appellants, and Attorney J. Bryce Kenny appeared for the Appellee.
SUMMARY
This case concerns an employment appeal from the Tribal Employment Rights
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Commission for the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation which denied back pay for additional duties assigned by Tribal Council to the Fit‑For‑Duty Officer, who enforced the Tribe's Drug Ordinance. The Tribal Court reversed and awarded back pay. We affirm.
JURISDICTION
This Court has personal jurisdiction over Appellee Millie Grant because she is a member of the Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe and resides within the exterior boundaries of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. Hoops Valley Tribal Code, (HVTC) §1.1.04(b). This Court has personal jurisdiction over Appellant Hoopa Valley Tribal Council (hereinafter referred to as Tribe) pursuant to the same section, because the Tribe filed its original action in Tribal Court, as well as the subsequent appeals. This Court has territorial jurisdiction over this action because the subject of this appeal occurred within the exterior boundaries of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. (HVTC §1.1.04(a)).
Further, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action as it arises from an appeal of the decision of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court and the Hoopa Valley TERO Commission.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter comes before the Hoopa Valley Supreme Court with a lengthy and confusing history. For clarity of this opinion, we will compile the history into the brief outline below.
The Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe hired Appellee Millie Grant as Director of the Department of Social Services for the Hoopa Valley Tribe. At issue is the addition to her Director duties of the “Fit‑For‑Duty” Officer duties assigned on January 18, 1996. Both Appellant and Appellee agree that Ms. Grant subsequently "on multiple occasions … requested additional compensation for her role as Fit‑For‑Duty Officer." (Plaintiffs Complaint for Money Damages at 3).
After having not received additional compensation, Ms. Grant appealed to the Tribal Council (the composition of the Council changed somewhat in the interim) to approve her salary increase retroactively. On December 16, 1998 the Council voted to deny Ms. Grant’s request for payment. On December 22, 1998 the Council again voted, there was a tie, and the Chairman voted to approve the payment. A check in the amount of $13,093.82 ($14,737.00 gross) was issued on December 22, 1998. After the meeting it was determined that one of the Council members should not have voted because he is Ms. Grant’s nephew (in violation of the nepotism ordinance). On December 28, 1998, then‑Chairman George "orally" notified Ms. Grant that the check was issued in error. On January 4, 1999 the Council voted to deny payment. The Tribal Attorney hand‑delivered a letter to Ms. Grant on January 6, 1999, which stated the payment was made in error and Ms. Grant had until January 8, 1999 to repay the money. Ms. Grant responded on January 7, 1999, requesting further investigation from the Council.
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It is unclear what transpired between January 7, 1999 and Ms. Grant's filing of her TERO Complaint on February 17, 1999. The record does reflect, however, that the Tribe filed a Complaint for Restitution and Monetary Damages in Tribal Court on February 25, 1999, prior to any resolution of the TERO action. On April 5, 1999, Ms. Grant responded to the Tribe's Complaint with a pleading the Trial Court termed a "Demurrer." In the Trial Court's written opinion the Tribe's Complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and the court ordered exhaustion of administrative remedies. On April 28, 1999, the Tribe appealed the Trial Court's decision.
The appeal was accepted by the Court of Appeals, which issued a ruling on October 29, 1999, staying further Court proceedings pending: (1) the TERO Commission's decision on whether it had jurisdiction to hear Ms. Grant's complaint; (2) conclusion of TERO proceedings with no appeal of the decision filed; or (3) conclusion of the TERO proceedings with appeal filed.
On June 20, 2000, the TERO Commission issued its decision on Ms. Grant's Complaint. The Commission held that Ms. Grant was "… not entitled to retroactive pay increase from February 1996 to December 1998 as compensation for the additional duties associated with the Fit‑For‑Duty assignment added to her position by action of the Tribal Council taken January 18,1996." The TERO Commission declined, however, to determine whether the check issued to Ms. Grant had to be repaid. Ms. Grant appealed the TERO Commission decision on July 19, 2000.
After a lengthy delay caused, in part, by the civil contempt on the part of Lori Hedge dba Hodge Depositions for failing to prepare the transcript of the TERO Commission hearing in a timely manner, this matter was heard by the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court. The Court, acting as the appellate body for TERO appeals, issued a ruling on January 28, 2003, finding that the TERO Commission decision was arbitrary and capricious and … not substantially supported by the evidence." (Opinion at 4). The Court held that Ms. Grant was "entitled to payment of the overdue wages in the amount of $10,000.00 per year, less $13,551.43 (the amount tendered in December 1998), plus applicable fringe benefits according to proof, and costs according to proof. (Id.).
On March 5, 2003, the Tribe (Appellant) then appealed to this Court, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Supreme Court by filing a Notice of Appeal and Petition for Appeal.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. What is the standard of review of this matter?
2. What is the applicability of Title 30?
6 NICS App. 151, HOOPA VALLEY v. MILLIE GRANT (August 2004) p. 154
DISCUSSION
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are three bodies reviewing this matter, the original administrative agency acting pursuant to the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance, the trial court acting as the Court of Appeals for the agency decision, and the Supreme Court reviewing the trial court decision. See HVTC §1.4.01(b). The Tribal Council has the authority under the tribal Constitution to create the three bodies. Article IX Section 1(n).
The Standard of Review for TERO decisions
The scope of review of a TERO decision is limited—the court does not hear new evidence. The court reviews "the same record and evidence that was used by the trial court." Tribal Education Department v. Nixon, C‑95‑028, Pages 8‑9 (1997) (Appellee's Opening Brief).
The Standard of Review for Trial Court review of TERO decisions
The opinion of Chief Justice Irvin in Ames v, Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, Dept of Public Safety, Hoopa Valley Court of Appeals, Case No. C-90-26 (November 14, 1991), was a concurring opinion, was not specifically adopted by the majority, and therefore is not controlling or binding upon this court. However, the reasoning of that concurring opinion is sound, and this court hereby adopts the substantial evidence test set forth by Chief Justice Irvin in Ames as the appropriate standard by which due process hearings are to be reviewed. This includes review not only by the TERO Commission from an agency due process hearing, but review by the tribal court from a due process hearing conducted by the TERO Commission. Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v. Gerstner, 22 I.L.R. 6000, 6002 (Hoopa Ct. App., Sept. 27, 1993)
The court will grant relief from a TERO Commission decision when the decision is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record; where the commission has not decided all issues requiring resolution; or where the decision is arbitrary or capricious. Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v. Gerstner, N. A‑92‑016, Pages 250, 253 (Sept. 27, 1993), Hoopa Forest Industries v. Jordan, C‑97‑049 (Feb. 27, 1998) (Appellee's Opening Brief).
"The Commission's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo by the appellate court." Hoopa Valley Tribal Police v. Pratt, C‑96‑048 (March 13, 1998). Respondent's Brief, P. 3. Review of legal determinations made by the Commission are (sic] 'de novo.' This standard means that this Court reviews legal determinations as a new matter, and is not required to grant any deference to legal determinations of the Commission. If a legal determination by the TERO Commission is not, in the judgment of this Court, in accordance with the law, the Court will substitute it legal judgment for that of the Commission. Opening Brief, at 4. See Nixon v. Tribal Education Department, C‑95‑028, pages 4‑5 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Court, June 27, 1996)
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affirmed, Tribal Education Department v. Nixon, 25 I.L.R.6250, C‑95-028 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Supreme Court, March 4, 1997).
Likewise, the holding in Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997) slates that review of the dismissal of an action is a legal determination that is conducted de novo. The Court shall uphold the decision of the Commission unless it is proven that the decision of the Commission is arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law .... Id., at 6007. See also, Tribal Education Department v. Nixon, C‑95‑028, page 7 (Hoopa. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 1997) (discussing appellate review of lower court decisions.)
The arbitrary and capricious standard refers to factual findings. Tribal Education Department v. Nixon, C‑95‑028, page 4 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Court, June 27, 1998), affirmed Tribal Education Department v. Nixon, 25 I.L.R. 6223 (Hoopa Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1997).
Under this standard, a TERO Commission's decision will be upheld if it is supported by "substantial evidence" on the record. Gerstner, 22 I.L.R. 6007. The Commission's findings of fact will not be disturbed if "substantial evidence" exists to support the Commission's decision. The administrative decision must not "be based purely upon speculation" or "based upon hearsay alone, or hearsay corroborated by a mere scintilla." Ames v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, Dept of Public Safety, Hoopa Valley Court of Appeals, Case No. C‑90-26 (November 14, 1991).
“Different standards exist for this Court's review of law and facts." See Nixon v. Tribal Education Department, C‑95‑028, Page 4 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Court, June 27, 1996).
Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v. Gerstner outlines the process for appellate review of a Tribal Employment Rights Commission decision. Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v, Gerstner, 22 I.L.R. 6002 (Hoopa Ct. App., Sept. 27, 1993).
This court has determined that the Trial Court properly reviewed the TERO Commission decision for reasons set out at length in this opinion.
The Standard of Review for Supreme Court review of Appellate Court decisions
"The appellate panel may either affirm the judgment as entered, modify it, or reverse the judgment by the majority vote, and its decision shall be final." Title I, Chapter 7, § 1.7.11 of the HVTC.
Pursuant to § 1.7.06 of the HVTC, this Court reviews the 'same record and evidence that was used by the Trial Court...' Tribal Education Dept v. Nicole Nixon, C‑95‑028, 25 ILR 6005, 6007.
In the Gerstner case, the Supreme Court of the Hoopa Valley (calling themselves the Court of Appeals) upheld the trial court's review of the TERO Commission by "finding that
6 NICS App. 151, HOOPA VALLEY v. MILLIE GRANT (August 2004) p. 156
substantial evidence exists to support the trial court, utilizing the test suggested by Chief Justice Irvin in Ames, infra. Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v. Gerstner, No. C‑92‑035, 22 ILR 6002, 6007 (Hoopa Ct. App., Sept 27, 1993).
This court will apply the same standard in reviewing the decision of the trial court.
APPLICATION OF TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES
The Hoopa Valley Tribal government has enacted a variety of laws and procedures to insure a fair and stable working environment for its employees. The consequence is that no governmental or administrative act affecting an employee is intended to occur in a void. Depending on the type of action, the responsibility to take one or more subsequent acts may arise. When the required subsequent acts do not take place, it is the employee who is cast into the void, and those who are successful at forcing the hand of responsible governmental and administrative actors to pull them out succeed because of their temperament and tenacity. This is not what the tribal government could have had in mind throughout the process of enacting the set of laws and procedures which apply here.
Title 30 of the Hoopa Tribal Code1 (hereinafter "Title 30") sets forth the organizational lines of responsibility and the required steps for taking personnel actions. Employees are required to abide by established lines of authority, unless otherwise advised by their Program Manager, or risk immediate disciplinary action, including termination.2 The Hoopa Valley Tribal Chairman is designated as the "Senior Executive Tribal Officer," and is charged with the ultimate responsibility and authority to implement Title 30, though these responsibilities may be delegated to a representative.3 The Chairman's duties include approving budget revisions, salary increases consistent with the budget, and making appointments to key position vacancies.4 The Hoopa Valley Tribal Council carries out a general oversight function over implementation of Title 30, and has discretionary oversight over the Chairman's administration of Title 30. When an employee is appointed to a position by the Tribal Council and/or the Council Chairman, he or she is classified as Political Appointment Personnel.5 Besides being appointed, as opposed to being hired through Recruitment and Selection, this class of employment does not have appeal rights under Title 30, except where discrimination is alleged. The Personnel Department is delegated general administrative authority to carry out Title 30, and is directed to provide support to the Tribal Council, Chairman, and other Program Managers.6
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Program Managers are given broad authority and responsibilities with regard to administration of personnel matters within their department.7 Among those duties they are required to initiate are: ultimate responsibility for knowledge and administration of Title 30, and consultation with the Personnel Director in the development of wage/salary classifications.
Title 30 sets forth policies and procedures for implementing classification and compensation for employee positions. Chapter 5, Conditions of Employment, requires that employees "shall receive clarification on all personnel matters affecting them such as fringe benefits [and] pay policies….”8 Under Chapter 10, Classification and Compensation, employees are assured that their compensation will be handled in an equitable manner with reference to equivalent positions and with regard to available funds.9 This chapter provides procedures for merit increases, but does not address changes in compensation for a revised position, or increases for when an employee assumes additional duties. Nevertheless, employees may have their duties revised, or additional duties assigned, at anytime.10
In light of the preceding review, as applied to the testimony provided, the position of Fit for Duty Officer (FDO) is a function of Program Management. The position is statutorily assigned to a Program Manager (Personnel Department Director), and when the position was transferred from the designated manager to the Human Services Director, it was initiated through the Tribal Council with subsequent reference to the Tribe's Legislative Procedures Act (LPA).11
Reassigning a function of Program Management between Directors in itself should require action by the Senior Executive Tribal Officer. Reassignment of functions at this level can be assumed to require considerations of appointment, budget revision and salary adjustment. When such consideration does not occur at the Senior Executive level, the Tribal Council, in its oversight capacity, is expected to eventually recognize the need for attention, and recommend action or remedial measures. In the meantime, Program Managers, exercising their statutory prerogative, can be expected to assume responsibility and initiate appropriate action when a personnel matter arises within their department.
When employees believe that circumstances impacting their terms of employment have resulted in unfair treatment, they may file a grievance under Chapter 9.12 However, neither Political Appointment Personnel, by statute, nor Program Managers, in effect, are provided this opportunity to remedy a violation of the terms of their employment. The grievance procedures
6 NICS App. 151, HOOPA VALLEY v. MILLIE GRANT (August 2004) p. 158
for managers only address appeal of disciplinary actions, and the employees' procedure requires they first attempt to resolve the matter with the immediate supervisor, within ten working days of the adverse action.13 For the situation at hand, the Appeals/Grievance Procedure either does not apply, or may be prohibitively awkward to apply.
At the time of reassignment of FDO responsibility, Senior Executives were focused on the possible impacts of a substantial loss of funding from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Revisions had been made to Title 30 during the previous year, however, testimony shows that most of the Tribal Council members were familiar with how personnel matters were handled in practice, but not familiar with the statutory obligations under that Title.
Further testimony from staff reveals that matters not resolved through application of procedure (e.g., submission and processing of a Personnel Action Form (PAF)), were assumed to be matters requiring the attention of, and a formal directive from, either the Tribe's policy body (i.e., Tribal Council, Tribal Chairman acting at the direction of the Council, or some delegate of the Chairman acting on his behalf, including an appropriate Program Manager), or an administrative Executive Staff committee. Even here, there were at least two options: a Program Manager could include a pay increase in a proposed budget, or may request to be placed on the agenda of a Tribal Council meeting. In one instance, testified to during the TERO hearing, an employee did not receive a raise because the department manager was unavailable. The oversight was not detected and remedied for about a year.14
It is not surprising that there was no immediate action to insure that the loose ends, resulting from the Council's emergency transfer of a Program Management function, were tied into place, particularly with regard to a necessary but unpopular personnel function, when there was a lack of clear direction in a unique situation, not addressed within Title 30, in the context of anticipated, substantial budget cuts. As to where to lay the ultimate responsibility for the resulting lack of follow‑through, it is clear that the Tribe intended that Title 30 would govern such matters, given both its scope and its specificity in addressing routine matters affecting personnel.
Even though Title 30 is not to be construed in the same manner as the terms of a contract for employment,15 it does state that its purpose and objectives are "to provide uniform and consistent practices to be followed in administering personnel related activities ..." and "to provide a fair and appropriate method for addressing personnel mailers of the Tribe."16 Applied here, the court understands this to mean that the elements and conditions required for the formation of a contract, as well as the defenses to its enforcement, are not applicable except where provided for within Title 30. That is, it does not avail the Tribe to claim that Ms. Grant
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was no longer entitled to receive a pay increase due to the passage of time from when it would have been appropriate to receive it, nor to argue that Ms. Grant has already been paid for services performed. Further, if Title 30 is to be applied in a "uniform and consistent manner," then taking no action in a situation that should require some sort of action should not be allowed to operate as an affirmative denial of an entitlement to consideration. It does not matter whether Ms. Grant's appointment as FDO was a constitutional appointment under Article XI, section 5 of the Constitution and Bylaws, a thirty (30) day emergency appointment under the Legislative Procedures Act (LPA), or a simple case of being given "other duties as assigned." No later than the following January after the appointment, the Tribe was required to provide Ms. Grant with an evaluation performance appraisal.17 Among the "most important aspects" of this process are "communication between the supervisor and employee regarding any changes in the employee's job."18 Responsibility for performing this appraisal lies with the appropriate Program Manager, unless the employee is receiving an introductory evaluation, in which case the Personnel Department is required to send a reminder that one is due, although failure to remind the manager does not excuse him or her from conducting the evaluation.19
Title 30 prohibits "retroactive” pay increases "before the date of approval by the appointing power authority," and requires the Program Manager to provide the necessary forms to the Personnel Department for timely implementation.20 "Retroactive" or "retrospective" laws "create new obligations [or] impose a new duty ... in respect to transactions or considerations already past."21 In this case, declaring Ms. Grant's alleged pay increase as void for being "retroactive" in violation of Title 30 requires finding that there was no dispute as to her salary at the time she was appointed FDO, but that the salary she received was the appropriate one and that any further entitlement was created anew and not the result of improper omission or oversight by the responsible authority. The tribal court refused to find that Ms. Grant was asking for a pay increase in its decision on appeal from the TERO Commission's ruling.22 The court here also declines to make that finding for the reasons which follow.
It is not clear at what point Ms. Grant's pay increase became mischaracterized as a request for retroactive pay, but it is clear that the mischaracterization persisted throughout the dispute, and caused various authorities to deny any obligation to pay the overdue wages. When Ms. Grant was appointed FDO, it was the standard practice of the tribe to compensate employees for assuming additional duties.23 The Chairperson at that time, Dale Risling, testified before the TERO Commission that one reason this was done was because a salary adjustment was "the first thing they asked for and they were almost always honored."24 At that same time, though, he
6 NICS App. 151, HOOPA VALLEY v. MILLIE GRANT (August 2004) p. 160
believed that responsibility for insuring a salary adjustment belonged to the "personnel division,"25 even though he had the authority to grant one himself.26
The testimony of Merv George, Jr., was that the standard practice was followed during his tenure as Chairperson,27 and that he had the authority to grant a pay increase in 1997 and 1998, when Ms. Grant was requesting one, but could not do so because her request was for retroactive pay, which would require Tribal Council approval.28 Garnering such approval, however, would most likely be the responsibility of either "a proactive employee that wants to make sure it gets done," or the personnel department, following up on its own.29
The point here is not to draw attention to the incongruity of the respective testimony, but to point out the consistency of what practice was being followed based on the same understanding. That is, each Chairperson throughout the time Ms. Grant was FDO believed that she was entitled to a salary increase for her additional duties, because that was the standard practice. Each knew that he had the authority to grant this increase, but believed that for some particular reason, it was the responsibility of the personnel department to follow through.
As the tribal court pointed out, there is no dispute as to what the Tribal Council members who testified at the TERO Commission believed at the time of Ms Grant's appointment.30 Plenny McCovey, Sr. believed Ms. Grant would receive a salary adjustment under the circumstances.31 Maude McCovey remembers that the Chairman was to insure Ms. Grant received a salary increase.32 Warren Tamerius understood that a salary increase would be forthcoming.33 Dale Risling assumed a salary increase would occur with the assignment of extra duties.34 Merv George, Jr., did not take part in whatever discussion there may have been concerning Ms. Grant's salary adjustment because the transfer of duties to her involved removing them from his aunt, Reva Grant. The preceding testimony makes clear that it was assumed that extra pay would go along with extra duties because that was the standard practice at the tribe at the time Ms. Grant became FDO.
One reason the confusion may have started was because the original appointment appears to have been implemented through the Tribe's Legislative Procedures Act (LPA). 35 If Ms. Grant was appointed FDO pursuant to that Ordinance, her appointment would have been effective for
6 NICS App. 151, HOOPA VALLEY v. MILLIE GRANT (August 2004) p. 161
only thirty (30) days unless extended for another period not to exceed thirty (30) days.36 Whether or not this aspect of her appointment was resolved is not apparent from the evidence before the court. Another reason may be that, according to Merv George, Jr., recommendations for salary increases "come from all over."37 In this context, it is not surprising that the tribal government took steps to prevent sudden sizeable payouts from being made to employees for wages they had earned but not received.38 However, the tribal laws and policies involved here do not clearly spell out that the affected employee has the ultimate burden of insuring that a salary increase gets processed in a timely fashion. The tribe offers a commitment to apply its laws and policies in this area in a fair and consistent manner, and directs that employees shall receive guidance in matters affecting them, yet at the same time, in practice, allows a variety of methods such that the intended procedures are overwhelmed in their application. This is not an environment where an employee should be allowed to become her own victim, and accordingly, this Court finds that the decision below should stand as entered.
ORDER
The trial court's decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal is dismissed.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court's Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this Reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
Personnel Policies and Procedures, revised May 18, 1995, were in effect throughout the events which led to this action.
§5.1
§2.2
Key positions include political appointments and Program Managers.
§3.1.1
§2.6, states that Program Managers have responsibility for personnel matters within their respective departments. Hence, the Personnel Department Director is a "Program Manager" with respect to Personnel Department employees. In addition, §2.4 directs that the Personnel Director is to also serve as the Fit for Duty Officer.
§2.6, see also §3.1.5.
5.3(4.)
See, §§10.1(2.), 10.2(2.). See also, §10.2(7.), requiring that Program Managers and the Tribal Council certify the availability of funding.
§5.4(2.) requires employees to perform "other duties as assigned." See also, §1.1.
Testimony of Warren Tamerius regarding Exhibit E, Transcript of TERO Commission Hearing (hereinafter “TERO Hearing"), pp. 41, 42.
§9.2
Id., see §9.1(1.).
Testimony of Steve Burbank, TERO Hearing, p.55.
§1.1. (Nevertheless, in‑accordance with §3.1.6, even contract employees are subject to Title 30 unless its applicability is superceded by specific contract language.)
§1.2
§6.1
Id. (emphasis added).
§6.1.1
§7.1.2
Black's Law Dictionary 1184 (5th ed. 1979).
Millie Grant v. The Hoopa Valley Tribe, No. A‑00‑002, (TERO No. T‑00‑08), January 28, 2003, at 2.
Testimony of Dale Risling, TERO Hearing, pp. 153, 154, 155.
Id., p. 155.
Id. See also, pp. 156‑157, "There would be no reason for her to come to me specifically."
Id., p. 157.
Testimony of Merv George, Jr., TERO Hearing, pp. 139, 140, 141.
Id., p. 146.
Id., pp. 150‑151.
Millie Grant v. The Hoopa Valley Tribe, No. A‑00‑002, (TERO No. T‑00‑08), January 28, 2003, at 3.
Testimony of Plenny McCovey, Sr., TERO Hearing, p. 21.
Testimony of Maude McCovey, TERO Hearing, p. 27.
Testimony of Warren Tamerius, TERO Hearing, p. 34.
Testimony of Plenny McCovey, Sr., TERO Hearing, p. 21.
Ordinance No. 4‑89, November 16, 1989. See supra note 11.
LPA §6.10.
Testimony of Merv George, Jr., TERO Hearing, p. 151.
See, Testimony of Leonard Masten, Jr., TERO Hearing, p. 111.