7 NICS App. 45, HOOPA VALLEY HOUSING v. DOOLITTLE (July 2005)
IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION
HOOPA, CALIFORNIA
Hoopa Valley Housing Authority, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Arlen Doolittle, Defendant/Appellee.
No. C-03-068/A-04-009 (July 18, 2005)
SYLLABUS*
Trial court granted a motion for reconsideration filed by the Defendant more than six months after the trial court had entered an order of eviction and a writ returning possession of a housing unit to the Housing Authority. Court of Appeals holds that because the Movant did not establish extraordinary circumstances that prevented Movant from receiving a fair trial, and because public policy favors finality of judgments where exceptional circumstances do not exist, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant the motion for reconsideration. Trial court order reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Housing Authority.
Before: William Joseph Moran, Chief Justice; J. D. Williams, Justice; Brian P. Coughenour, Justice.
Appearances: David Dehnert, Attorney at Law for Appellant Hoopa Valley Housing Authority; Keith Taylor, Center for Indian Law & Economic Justice, Inc., Counsel for Appellee Arlen Doolittle.
OPINION
Moran, C. J.:
Plaintiff/Appellant Hoopa Valley Tribal Housing Authority appeals the trial court’s order granting Defendant/Appellee’s Request for Reconsideration resulting in its separate subsequent order reversing its prior final judgment of December 6, 2004. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
7 NICS App. 45, HOOPA VALLEY HOUSING v. DOOLITTLE (July 2005) p. 46
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case is grounded in civil procedure and contract law and concerns an Indian housing agency seeking to repossess a housing unit claiming contract default and to recover damages from the defaulting tenant/homebuyer. The case moved slowly through the procedural steps for claims of unlawful detainer under the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code of the Hoopa Valley Tribe, Hoopa, California. The original action began on July 15, 2003 culminating in this appeal filed December 21, 2004.
The Hoopa Valley Housing Authority filed its Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court on July 15, 2003. Defendant/Appellee Arlen Doolittle did not answer. There was notice and opportunity to defend at hearings accorded the Defendant/Appellee throughout the litigation process and that is a part of the record below. Appellant’s Motion for Default Judgment was granted and a default judgment entered on September 11, 2003. Mr. Doolittle was ordered to vacate the premises by October 5, 2003. The Housing Authority then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession of Real Property on October 10, 2003 and the trial court issued its Entry of Writ of Possession. Mr. Doolittle answered the original Motion for Default Judgment on October 22, 2003 requesting the tribal court to set aside its order of default alleging that he was incarcerated at the time of service of process and was unable to appropriately answer. The tribal court set aside its Entry of Writ of Possession and set the matter for a hearing at which time the court ordered the parties to settle the matter through mediation. On January 16, 2004 the parties filed a Stipulated Settlement with the court wherein Mr. Doolittle agreed to pay the housing authority $150 per month until an overdue “balance of $2303.18 was paid off.” The court entered its Order Following Hearing on January 27, 2004.
On April 2, 2004, the Appellant filed its Notice of Motion and Motion for Show Cause Hearing alleging breach of the Stipulated Agreement. The matter was set for hearing on April 22, 2004. At the conclusion of this hearing the Housing Authority was granted an order of eviction providing that Mr. Doolittle vacate the housing unit and that he pay payments per the original contract. On May 6, 2004 the court issued it’s a new Writ of Possession of Real Property. The Appellee vacated the property on July 5, 2003. On November 15, 2004, a full six months after the May 6, 2004 Writ was issued, Appellee filed his Request for Reconsideration. The Housing Authority filed its Opposition to the Request for Reconsideration on November 29, 2004. The trial court granted the Request for Reconsideration and heard the matter on December 2, 2004. On December 6, 2004 the Tribal trial court issued its Order reversing its Order of May 6, 2004. The trial court cited Hoopa Valley Tribal Code, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 42(b)(6) as authority for reversing its prior Order. It is this Order and the Order accepting the Request for Reconsideration that the Hoopa Valley Housing Authority appeals.
7 NICS App. 45, HOOPA VALLEY HOUSING v. DOOLITTLE (July 2005) p. 47
Appellant alleges inter alia that the trial court abused its discretion by hearing the Motion for Reconsideration in the first instance six months after entering its final judgment and secondly by entering its new final order reversing its prior final judgment in favor of the Plaintiff/Appellant without finding “exceptional circumstances”1 that would allow the trial court to use its equitable discretionary power to rehear the matter pursuant to Rule 42(b)(6) of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Code, Title 3. The Appellant alleges the trial court misinterpreted the law allowing reconsideration of final judgments and therefore abused its discretion. We agree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The proper standard of review is “Abuse of Discretion.” The Hoopa Valley Tribal Code has not designated a standard of review for trial court decisions in an unlawful detainer action. The Appellant has cited Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (1988) for guidance. We look to federal law for guidance where the tribal code is silent. Title 2 HVTC 2.1.01 provides that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant cases may be cited as persuasive authority where the federal rules are analogous to Hoopa Rules of Court, and Title 3 HVTC Rule 42 specifically provides that FRCP 60 and relevant federal cases may be looked to as persuasive argument regarding the interpretation of Hoopa Court Rule 42. The United States Supreme Court in Pierce, 487 U. S. 552 at 558 guides this Court as follows: “decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories, denominated questions of law (reviewed de novo), questions of fact (reviewed for clear error) and matters of discretion (reviewed for “abuse of discretion”).” In the instant case the Tribal trial court based its order on a provision of 3 HVTC Rule 42(b)(6) that provides that the trial court has discretion to overturn a prior judgment in limited circumstances “justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”
Where, as here, the standard of review is abuse of discretion, this court will review de novo whether the lower court committed (1) a clear error of judgment in its conclusion based on the weight of the relevant factors, (2) applied the wrong law or (3) its decision rested on clearly erroneous findings of material fact. United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting SEC v. Codicutt, 258 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2001). In the case at hand the trial court used its discretion to render a decision over-ruling a prior trial court Order without a proffer of evidence of extraordinary circumstance.
7 NICS App. 45, HOOPA VALLEY HOUSING v. DOOLITTLE (July 2005) p. 48
ISSUE PRESENTED:
Whether the tribal trial court abused its discretion in granting the “Request for Re-Consideration”?
ANALYSIS
The nexus of this appeal is based on whether the tribal court should have allowed Appellee to avail himself of the benefit of Rule 42(b), which as presented in the record is taken from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). That latter rule is an attempt to provide a litigant relief from judgment or order where certain conditions are found. Pioneer Investors. Services Company v. Brunswick Associates, Ltd., 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1497-98 (1993). Rule 60(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. provides a means whereby a litigant can have an unjust decision overturned where certain conditions are presented to the trial court as in the case before us. The Tribal trial court interpreted Rule 42(b)(6) more broadly than Rule 60(b)(6) has been interpreted. Rule 42(b)(6), then is not a means for the litigant to enter the court on a motion to reconsider the court’s decision after a judgment and after the time for appeal has run without more information made available to the Court showing extraordinary circumstances existed at the time of the hearing that was not presented to the decision maker. These extraordinary circumstances must have been present at the time of the original hearing of May 6, 2004, at which time the order or judgment that spawned the appeal was rendered. In the December 6, 2004 reconsideration request, the reasons given by Mr. Doolittle, were that since the hearing, a tribal agency has volunteered to come to his aid and provide research into the problem and offer assistance from that standpoint. This latter information was not available to the trial court at the May 6, 2004 hearing because the tribal agency TANF’s offer to Mr. Doolittle had not been made at the time of that original hearing. The court could not have heard extraordinary circumstances then and surely not at the time the Court accepted the Request for Reconsideration to rehear the then adjudicated matter. Swift Chemical Company v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 490 F.Supp.1343, 1351 (E.D. La. 1980).
The Rule 60(b)(6) process dictates that the movant supply some showing of the existence of extraordinary circumstances were present at the time of rendering the original order and that that information or evidence was not proffered and that somehow without reconsideration an injustice would occur. See, e.g., U.S. v. Washington, 394 F.3d at 1157 (“a party seeking to reopen a case under Rule 60(b)(6) must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control that prevented him from proceeding with the prosecution or defense of the action in a proper fashion.") Without that showing of some extraordinary circumstance, this court would not have a basis of reviewing whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. Given the information that was available to the trial court at the time it granted the Motion for Reconsideration, would a reasonable judge have granted the motion? A Federal District Court in Texas explains it best when asked to determine the propriety of a judge’s decision, “An abuse of discretion is established only where no reasonable man could agree with
7 NICS App. 45, HOOPA VALLEY HOUSING v. DOOLITTLE (July 2005) p. 49
the district court; if reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the court’s action, no abuse of discretion has been shown.” Consor v. Occidental Life Insurance Company, 469 F. Supp. 1110, 1117, n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Rule 60(b)(6) is the residual section of Rule 60(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was never intended to replace the benefit of appeal. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981). Appellee/Defendant did not supply supporting evidence to the court enabling the court to find “extraordinary circumstances” necessitating reconsideration.
We are also mindful of the guidance provided by the federal courts regarding the need to consider the potential prejudice to the parties and the need for predictability in the judicial process.
Weighing against the grant of a 60(b) motion is the desirability of finality in judgments. This is particularly true where the reopening of a judgment could unfairly prejudice the opposing party. (Citation omitted). But even without such prejudice, the desirability of orderliness and predictability in the judicial process speaks for caution in the reopening of judgments.
Swift Chemical Company, 490 F.Supp. at 1350.
Here, we believe considerations of prejudice and public policy in favor of predictability and finality weigh heavily in favor of the Housing Authority. Public policy strongly supports the Housing Authority's position that respecting the finality of judgments in the absence of a showing of exceptional circumstances is in the best interest of the Tribe and its members. As much as the courts may have sympathy for Mr. Doolittle and his family, the courts must also recognize that there are other needy and deserving families on the Tribal housing waiting list. The Tribal Council has crafted an overall statutory scheme encouraging speed and finality in resolving unlawful detainer and eviction proceedings concerning Tribal housing. It is an abuse of discretion for the judiciary to exercise its discretion in a manner such as it has here that runs contrary to this overall statutory scheme by causing delays and legal liabilities that may result in Tribal Housing units remaining vacant for months or even years at a time because the Housing Authority cannot have confidence that a determination of its rights and obligations is truly final and binding. This would constitute severe prejudice to the Housing Authority and undermine public confidence in the judicial process. This constitutes “a clear error of judgment … based on the weight of the relevant factors” under U.S. v. Washington, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court, despite its good intentions, abused its discretion because 1) the trial court failed to require a showing that extraordinary circumstances prevented Appellee from receiving a fair trial and 2) the trial court did not give proper weight to the prejudice that would result to the Housing Authority and Tribal members on the housing waiting list if the predictability of valid unlawful detainer judgments were to be called into question in this manner.
7 NICS App. 45, HOOPA VALLEY HOUSING v. DOOLITTLE (July 2005) p. 50
The May 6, 2004 Order Following Hearing is reversed and remanded for the entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court's Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this Reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
Hoopa Valley Tribal Code, Rule 42 (b) (6), provides provisions for relief of judgments to replace equitable remedies or old common law writs that may be available. It is a near image of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b). FRCP, Rule 60 (b) is based upon California Code of Civilian Procedure § 473 (Deering 1937), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Thomas A. Coyne, 2nd Ed. VII-81. Rule 42 (b) (6) is the catchall section that provided courts with the discretion to provide relief from judgments where the other sections 42 (b) (1) through (5) do not pertain. Section (6) provides: “Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Courts have held that a showing of extraordinary circumstances is a prerequisite to court approval of this method of relief as distinguished from the previous sections (1) through (5) and is not intended to replace filing an appeal.