8 NICS App. 15, COLEGROVE v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COUNCIL (March 2007)
IN THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION
HOOPA, CALIFORNIA
Joanna J. Colegrove, Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Hoopa Valley Tribal Council and Tribal TANF, Defendants.
No. C-05-069/A-06-005 (March 23, 2007)
SYLLABUS*
Trial court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, despite Plaintiff’s failure to respond to motion. Court of Appeals rules that Plaintiff’s failure to respond to motion for summary judgment combined with Plaintiff’s failure to appear before the Court of Appeals or comply with its order compels grant of Defendant’s petition for preemptory writ. Trial court order remanded with direction to grant summary judgment for Defendant.
Before: Michelle Demmert, Chief Justice; Lisa Brodoff, Justice; Eric Nielsen, Justice.
OPINION
This matter comes before the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court of Appeals pursuant to the Petition for Preemptory Writ filed with the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court on September 3, 2006 by the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council and Hoopa Valley Tribal TANF (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Tribe”). On October 2, 2006, The Court of Appeals issued a writ staying the trial in this matter set for October 5, 2006. The Court now grants the writ and directs summary judgment be entered in favor of the Hoopa Valley Tribal TANF.
This appeal arises from a civil complaint of “Unjustified Employment Termination” filed by Plaintiff/Respondent Joanna Colegrove in the Tribal Court on October 27, 2005. Following discovery and inconclusive settlement discussions, on June 16, 2006, the Tribe filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported by extensive documentary evidence. Despite Ms. Colegrove’s complete failure to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment in any way, on August 30, 2006 the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court denied the Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
8 NICS App. 15, COLEGROVE v. HOOPA VALLEY TRIBAL COUNCIL (March 2007) p. 16
The Tribe argues that this Court should direct that summary judgment be entered in favor of the TANF, because, among other things, the Tribal Court erred by applying summary judgment standards not in accordance with Tribal law, relied on hearsay evidence in violation of the rules governing summary judgment, and otherwise committed procedural error.
It does appear to this Court that the Tribal Court Judge applied the wrong standard1 and committed evidentiary and procedural errors in deciding the Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment.2 However, we need not decide this case on those grounds.
The Scheduling Order issued by this Court on December 22, 20063 gave all parties clear notice that failure to appear for oral argument “may result in sanctions, up to and including a default judgment in favor of the opposing party.” Ms. Colegrove failed to appear for oral argument without explanation. Ordinarily, this Court would not issue a ruling in favor of the opposing party based on a party’s failure to appear for oral argument. However, Ms. Colegrove’s conduct throughout these entire proceedings, including her failure to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, her failure to submit a written brief or file any sort of appearance or motion in response to the Tribe’s Petition for Preemptory Writ, and her failure to comply with this Court’s Order to appear for oral argument, compel us to grant the Tribe’s Petition for Preemptory Writ. We therefore remand this matter to the Tribal Court with direction that summary judgment be granted in favor of the Tribal TANF.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this Reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
The Tribal Court order itself adopts the rule that “[i]f the moving party demonstrates that no issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts on to the nonmoving party to present specific facts as evidence, beyond allegations or denials in the pleadings, that show a contradiction is possible” (citation omitted; emphasis added). Yet the Court seems to have based its denial of the Motion entirely upon the allegations and denials contained in an unsworn, unsigned document submitted by the Tribe, rather than the plaintiff. The Court’s failure to strictly follow the procedures set forth in HVTC 2.4.04 appear to have contributed to the misapplication of the standard set forth in the tribal court rules and cases cited by the Tribe.
For example, HVTC 2.4.04(c) requires an opposition to be filed to a motion for summary judgment within 14 days unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. Here, no opposition was filed, nor did the court issue any order excusing this failure. HVTC 2.4.04(c) also requires the opposition to include affidavits, declarations, and other forms of sworn testimony. And while HVTC 2.4.04(c) does grant the trial judge discretion to waive the requirement for a “separate statement” and qualifies the list of acceptable evidence with the clause “as appropriate,” nowhere does the code suggest that the judge may rely on unsworn statements or hearsay in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Moreover, HVTC 2.4.04(b) and (f) firmly establish that a hearing be held on a Motion for Summary Judgment where the parties may object to proffered evidence prior to the judge ruling on the Motion.
Filed by the Tribal Court Clerk on December 26, 2006.