IN RE WELFARE OF S.S.

24 NICS App. 4, IN RE WELFARE OF S.S. (March 2026)

IN THE PUYALLUP TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS

PUYALLUP INDIAN RESERVATION

TACOMA, WASHINGTON

In re the Welfare of S.S.

Puyallup Tribe Children’s Services, Appellant,

Dannyelle Sellers, Thomas Guerrero, Appellees.

NO. PUY-CV-AP-2025-0170 (March 3, 2026)

SYLLABUS*

Appellant challenged trial judge’s suggestion that some of its staff leave the courtroom and the denial of its motion to recuse judge for alleged bias. Court of Appeals found that judge’s suggestion was not a final order and therefore not appealable, and treated the denial of the recusal motion as a final order for purposes of review. Court of Appeals determined that appellant failed to meet procedural requirements for recusal because it did not submit the required affidavit or certification of good faith. Court concluded that judge’s actions, aimed at maintaining courtroom order and reducing pressure on an unrepresented party, did not demonstrate bias, particularly where appellant ultimately prevailed in the underlying decision. Court of Appeals affirmed denial of the recusal motion and remanded case for further proceedings.

Before:	Daniel A. Raas, Chief Judge; Patricia L. Davis, Judge; Brett Lee Shelton, Judge.
Appearances:	Jacqueline Shopbell, for Appellant; Dannyelle Sellers, pro se; Kyle Ahern for Appellee Thomas Guerrero.

OPINION

Per curiam:

24 NICS App. 4, IN RE WELFARE OF S.S. (March 2026) p. 5

I. INTRODUCTION

The Puyallup Tribal Children’s Services (‘PTCS’) appeals from the in-trial suggestion of the Children’s Court Judge that certain of its staff leave the courtroom during a hearing regarding PTCS’ proposed placement of S.S., the minor whose welfare is a the heart of this case.¹ PTCS also appeals from the denial of its formal Motion for Recusal (‘Recusal Motion’) directed to the Children’s Court Judge presiding over the hearings in this matter.

PTCS claims that the Trial Court’s suggestion (the ‘suggestion’) that PTCS staff leave the courtroom is in error because the staff members are to be treated as parties in this case and a trial court cannot bar parties from a hearing at which their interests are being adjudicated. Appellant PTCS also separately argues that the staffers cannot be removed because they are officers of the Puyallup Tribe charged with supervision of PTCS.

The Recusal Motion is based on allegations that the Trial Judge was biased against PTCS as shown by the Court’s actions and the ‘suggestion’.

II. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Puyallup Tribal Code 4.16.320 provides that “Any party aggrieved by any final order, commitment, or judgment of the Puyallup Tribal Court may appeal such order, commitment or judgment to the Appellate Court….”² At issue is whether the ‘suggestion’ or the denial of the Recusal Motion is a “final order, commitment or judgment”. The ‘suggestion’, especially since the parties agree that the PTCS staff did not leave the courtroom, is not a “final order” within the definition in this Ordinance.

The denial of the Recusal Motion may be or may not be a “final order”. On the one hand, the allegations and supporting evidence in a motion for recusal may be so serious that, when coupled with the decision by the challenged Judge, a denial of recusal may be tantamount to a determination of the action, thus making the denial a de facto “final order’. On the other hand, the allegations and supporting evidence, when paired with the eventual outcome of the case, may be plainly insufficient to be a determination of the case at bar. In light of the determination below, this appeal does not require a ruling on this question and for the purposes of this appeal only, the denial of the Recusal Motion will be treated as a “final order”.

III. SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ‘SUGGESTION’ AND THE RECUSAL MOTION

PTC 4.16.200 deals with disqualification of a judge and reads:

24 NICS App. 4, IN RE WELFARE OF S.S. (March 2026) p. 6

4.16.200 Bias or prejudice of Judge.

(a) Any Puyallup Tribal Court Judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which he or she has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) Whenever a party to any proceeding in Puyallup Tribal Court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the Judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or her, or in favor of any adverse party, or if his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, then such Judge shall pass on the adequacy of the affidavit of prejudice and enter the appropriate order, either hearing the case or reassigning it to another Judge.

(c) The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not more than 20 days following service of the complaint in a civil action, and not more than seven days following arraignment in a criminal action, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record or by the individual party if pro se, stating that it is made in good faith.

A. Compliance with the statute

Section 200(b), supra, requires a “timely and sufficient” affidavit alleging that the Judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” See: §200(a). Section 200(c) further defines “sufficient”: “The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists,..” And §200(c) also requires counsel for the moving party to certify in a separate document that the Motion is made in good faith.

The Children’s Court Order Denying the Recusal Motion found as facts that there was neither an affidavit nor a counsel’s certificate attached to the Motion for Recusal. These facts are not challenged on appeal and are thus verities for this Court. The failure to include these sworn statements mandates that we affirm the Order Denying Motion for Recusal.

B. Discussion of the Record

The first sentence of PTC 4.08.030 reads: “This code shall be liberally construed to provide a just and equitable result for the parties to civil actions and members of the Puyallup Reservation community generally, and to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every civil action.” In furtherance of securing a speedy and inexpensive determination of the underlying proceeding uninterrupted by appeals, the substance of PTCS’ allegations regarding the Children’s Court Judge will be analyzed as if they were properly presented pursuant to PTC §4.16.200.³

24 NICS App. 4, IN RE WELFARE OF S.S. (March 2026) p. 7

The primary evidence relied upon by the Appellant to show the Children’s Court Judge’s bias against PTCS is the Court’s ‘suggestion’ that certain PTCS staff remove themselves from the courtroom in order to not put undue pressure on the child’s mother, who was unrepresented and otherwise alone in the courtroom.⁴ Of importance is that when these PTCS staff did not exit the courtroom, the Judge took no further action. The Court also admonished certain PTCS staffers not to interrupt the presentation of evidence by speaking to trial counsel. Of additional significance is that the Judge adopted the recommendations of PTCS in the ultimate ruling. PTCS showed no harm from the denial of the Recusal Motion, notwithstanding the failure to meet the requirements of PTC §4.16.200. Put simply, a Judge’s admonition which is not to a party’s liking when made pursuant to a clearly enunciated judicial power does not indicate bias.

PTC 4.16.220(a) recites that a Judge’s duty is to try cases, and §4.16.220(f) gives a Judge the explicit power to “Issue any order or writ necessary and proper to the complete exercise of these powers and the general authority of the Court, including those necessary to compel compliance with orders of the Court and to punish persons for failure to comply.” This last emphatically gives a trial court the right to control activity within the courtroom by counsel, parties and observers. If counsel, parties or observers act so as to hinder the judicial search for true and accurate testimony or evidence then the power to, among other sanctions, order the offending individual(s) to exit the courtroom or otherwise behave appropriately, is plainly within the Court’s authority, and does not by itself constitute grounds for recusal. Even if the Appellant’s instances of alleged judicial bias had been properly pled, they would not rise to judicial misconduct requiring recusal or disqualification.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Children’s Court Order on Motion for Recusal is AFFIRMED. This matter is REMANDED to the Children’s Court for further proceedings.

The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.

The details of the recommendation and the circumstances surrounding the recommended placement are not germane to this appeal.

The appeal was timely filed under this section.

This discussion is needed lest the Appellant refile the Recusal Motion with an Affidavit reciting the same facts that it previously neglected to provide in a sworn statement.

The mother’s parents whose presence might have offered some support to their daughter had earlier been excluded from the closed courtroom on motion of PTCS because they were not proper parties. There was also evidence in the record that the parents’ position might not have been wholly supportive of the mother.