24 NICS App. 8, IMHOLT v. SHOPBELL (March 2026)
IN THE TULALIP TRIBAL COURT OF APPEALS
TULALIP INDIAN RESERVATION
TULALIP WASHINGTON
Rachay Imholt, Appellant (Respondent below)
v.
Monqiue Shopbell, Appellee (Petitioner below).
NO. TUL-CV-AP-2025-1099 (March 20, 2026)
SYLLABUS*
Tribal Court issued a one-year anti-harassment protection order against appellant, which she appealed on evidentiary and sufficiency grounds. Court of Appeals reversed order because Tribal Court failed to make specific findings of fact, preventing meaningful review of the evidence. Court of Appeals held that courts must identify facts and supporting evidence for each element of harassment, as without such detail appellate courts cannot determine whether the legal standard was met. Case was remanded for entry of sufficient findings, with the protection order remaining in effect pending further proceedings.
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Before: Appearances: |
Daniel A. Raas, Chief Justice; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Associate Justice; John C. Sledd, Associate Justice. Rachay Imholt, pro se; Monique Shopbell, pro se. |
OPINION
J Sledd:
The Tribal Court entered a civil anti-harassment Permanent Protection Order, restraining Ms. Imholt from contact with or proximity to Ms. Shopbell for a period of one year. Ms. Imholt appealed. Her Notice of Appeal challenged evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish harassment. We reverse because the court failed to make findings of fact, without which we are unable to review the sufficiency of the evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review conclusions of law de novo – that is, we determine what the law is without regard to the Tribal Court’s determinations. TTC 2.20.090(4). Where the court exercised
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discretion, such as in the duration of restraint ordered, we review for abuse of discretion. TTC 2.2.090(8). We review findings of fact for clear error, TTC 2.2.090 (1), and so may disregard a Tribal Court finding only if the record as a whole leaves us “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” E.g., Renee Cloud v. Estate of Neil Buck Cloud, 16 NICS App. 31, 33 (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. App., 2018), citing U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
ANALYSIS
We begin and will end with appellant’s claim that the evidence did not support a finding of harassment.
To enable appellate review under the Code, the Tribal Court must make findings of fact as to each element of the Petitioner’s claim. Moses v. Fleek, 13 NICS App. 25, 26-27 (Tulalip Tribal Ct. App. 2015) (“The lack of explicit written or oral findings of fact regarding all of the statutory elements … needed to support an Order for Protection makes meaningful appellate review of the Trial Court’s Permanent Protection Order impossible….).1 Moreover, the findings must identify supporting evidence. Neff v. Port Susan Camping Club, 8 NICS App. 32, 33 (Tulalip Tribal Ct. App. 2007)(Court of Appeals cannot affirm “without trial court findings that point to supporting evidence in the record….”). Many other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. E.g., Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe v. Callihoo, 10 NICS App. 124, 128-129 (Port Gamble S’Klallam Ct. App., 2012) (to provide due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act and enable appellate review, written findings are required “as to the evidence relied on and the reasons”).
The civil anti-harassment provisions of the Tribal Code do not define the elements of “harassment.” Another Code section defines that term but only “for the purposes of” the crime of Stalking. TTC 4.25.390(5)(b). Nevertheless, mindful of our obligation to construe the Code as a whole, TTC 2.05.030(7)(d), we will apply this definition here. Thus, to sustain its order, he Tribal Court had to make factual findings as to these five elements:
that the Respondent “engag[ed] in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person;”
that the conduct “seriously alarm[ed], annoy[ed], or [was] detrimental to such person;”
that the conduct “serve[d] no legitimate or lawful purpose;”
that the course of conduct was “such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress;” and
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that the conduct “actually cause[d] substantial emotional distress to the victim.”2
The Protection Order in this case is on a printed form containing preprinted statements. Boxes are checked next to some statements to signify they are applicable. Only two checked statements address the allegedly harassing conduct. The first is that “Based upon the petition, testimony, case record, and response, if any, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the protected person (or petitioner on their behalf) has proved the required criteria for the following protection order under … TTC 4.25.750 (harassment).” The second is that “The restrained person has subjected the protected person to unlawful harassment.” Order of Protection (Oct. 6, 2025), p. 4.
These findings are not sufficient under our precedents. They fail to say what the harassing conduct was or to describe the evidence that proved any of the elements of harassment. The blanket statement that the elements were proven is not enough. See Neff v. Port Susan Camping Club, supra, (a finding that the “trial record contains substantive evidence supporting” decision was not sufficient); see also, Brown v. Puyallup Tribe, 14 NICS App. 15, 17 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. App. 2016) (“We strongly suggest that the [checked box]format for the … Decision be changed to allow the entry of specific written factual findings to support the legal conclusions made. This will greatly aid the provision of normal due process….”). Without more specific findings and identification of supportive evidence this Court cannot review, and the parties are left to speculate as to what the Tribal Court thought happened and why it ruled as it did, undermining their trust in and willingness to obey the court’s orders.
Ms. Imholt suggests that the Court of Appeals might remedy the situation by reviewing the record de novo and determining for itself whether the preponderance of the evidence established the elements of harassment and justified the protection order. To do so would duplicate the work of the Tribal Court and intrude on its role under the Code. TTC 2.10.150(3), 4.25.800(1).3
All this is not to suggest that the Tribal Court must make detailed written findings of every supporting evidentiary fact. “[T]he question of what constitutes sufficiency of the findings … is a very practical one. The ultimate test … is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision.” 9C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2579 at n. 23 (3d ed.). The level of detail and formality may vary depending on factors like factual complexity and the significance of the matters at stake and based on any Code requirements for a particular class of cases. See, e.g., TTC 4.20.420(4)(c) (in parental custody dispute, Court must “detail[] its findings of fact … including its consideration of the factors” set by Code for
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allocating parenting responsibilities). In some cases, oral findings may suffice. See TTC 2.10.160(1) (written judgment “may” include findings of fact”). At a minimum, however, the record must contain discrete, identifiable oral or written findings of facts sufficient to establish each element of the cause of action on which the judgment rests, together with some reference to the key supporting evidence. The form order used here falls short of that.
CONCLUSION
The decision below is reversed and the case is remanded. Within sixty days, the Tribal Court shall enter an amended order including findings of fact or shall take such other action as is consistent with this decision and applicable law. Meanwhile, the Permanent Protection Order shall remain in effect. Any amended final order shall be subject to new appeal.
The syllabus is not a part of the Court’s Opinion. The syllabus is a summary of the Opinion prepared by the publishers of this reporter only for the convenience of the reader. Therefore, the syllabus should not be cited in whole or part as legal authority. Only the Opinion, which follows the syllabus, may be cited as legal authority.
The Civil Rules of Court provide that that judgments must be in writing and that, in entering judgment, the court “may make” findings of fact. TTC 2.10.160. This permissive phrasing may leave room to omit findings in cases where facts are not in dispute. Cf. 9C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2579 at nn. 11, 12 (3d ed.)( Federal Civil Rules do not require findings on undisputed facts).
If this Code definition were inapplicable, TTC 2.25.030(7)(b) would require that we use the “plain meaning” or “usual understanding” of the term. A dictionary definition of “harass” is “to vex, trouble, or annoy continually or chronically (as with anxieties, burdens, or misfortune).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993). The definition for the crime of Stalking is not inconsistent.
Even if this Court was allowed to independently assess the facts, the record before us is insufficient to do so. It does not include Appellee’s petition, which was to contain a sworn statement of the “specific facts and circumstances” from which protection was sought. TTC 4.25.780(1). The audio records do not describe documents using exhibit numbers or sufficient specifics to be sure which documents the court was considering. The parties’ briefs also did not provide “appropriate references” to the record, TTC 2.25.070(1), such as page or exhibit numbers or times on the audio clock, which would facilitate our review. Because we reverse for errors on the face of the Permanent Order, these problems do not affect our decision.